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A combination of factors contributes to actual or potential economic exclusion of young people in Syria. This paper focuses on three of them: economic, social, and institutional. Instead of drawing attention to the multidimensionality of youth economic exclusion, our paper highlights the interaction among the contributing factors. We suggest that multiple risk factors associated with youth economic exclusion add to one another so that they have a stronger cumulative effect than they would individually. The paper begins by presenting the Syrian context and then discussing each of the three factors in detail.
Syria is a lower middle-income country with per capita income of $3,400 in 2003, close to that of Egypt and Morocco. In 2001, the Syrian government began initiating a series of reforms to help move the country away from a public sector-led development model towards a social market economy. The reforms come when Syria is facing many internal and external pressures including the possibility of becoming a net oil importer by 2012.
As with other countries in the Middle East, a demographic wave is moving through the Syrian population creating a "youth bulge." The share of youth in the Syrian population peaked at 25.4 percent in 2005, presenting challenges in terms of job creation for young people. In 2002, unemployed youth made up 77 percent of the working-age unemployed population in Syria. At the same time, the youth bulge created a window of opportunity for lower dependency ratios to lead to greater savings and higher rates of economic growth (World Bank, 2004) . If youth are not able to fully participate in their economic spheres, the country foregoes the chance to benefi t from this "demographic dividend."
Over 98 percent of young men are economically active (in school, employed, or looking for work). Among young women, the inactivity rate increase from 2 percent at age 11, to 24 percent by age 15, to 73 percent by age 29. Labor force outcomes are correlated with educational attainment. Activity rates are near 99 percent for young men (age 15-29) at all levels of educational attainment expect for illiterate persons, who have activity rates of
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only 84 percent, possibly due to seasonal jobs. Activity rates among young women (age 15-29) increases substantially with level of educational attainment, from 36 percent for primary-school completers to over 80 percent for post-secondary school completers.
The unemployment rate among youth (ages 15-24) in Syria stood at 26 percent in 2002, close to the Middle Eastern average. What distinguishes the Syrian case is that unemployment rates among youth are more than six times higher than those among adults -the highest ratio among the region's countries outside the Gulf States. While this high ratio is the result of relatively low unemployment rates among Syrian adults (4 percent) compared to other Middle Eastern countries, it is nonetheless an indication of possible youth exclusion problems in Syria. In addition, young women in Syria are less than half as likely to participate in the labor force compared to young men (30 versus 67 percent) and nearly twice as likely to be unemployed (39 versus 21 percent), stressing the importance of gender in our analysis.
THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Many of the economic elements behind the observed employment outcomes for youth appear due to transient factors not necessarily related to exclusion, including labor supply pressures and government education policies. Other elements are more structural, including skills mismatches, public sector employment policies, and lack of access to affordable housing in urban centers.
A contributing factor to high youth unemployment rates is likely to have been labor supply growth rates of around 5 percent per year between 1983 and 2003, due mainly to demographic trends. The number of young people in the labor force is expected to grow, but by less than 2 percent per year. Thus, labor supply pressures are transitory and arguably do not require long-term policy intervention. However, short-term intervention is required to ensure that today's unemployed youth do not become tomorrow's unemployed adults. The full impact of the labor supply pressures was mitigated by the emigration of many young Syrians to other countries.
Another transient factor was a government policy to increase enrolment in vocational secondary schools during the 1980s and 1990s. This policy increased dropout rates and likely contributed to exceptionally high unemployment rates among vocational school completers. The policy has since been reversed. By comparison, educational mismatch plays an ongoing role in youth exclusion. There is evidence that education system is not providing young people with the skills needed to succeed in the labor market, contributing to long wait times and often requiring young people to accept lower wages and lower quality jobs that do not really match their learned skills.
Another structural factor is public sector employment policies, which offer greater job security, higher benefi ts and, among young women, higher wages than in the private sector. Syrian youth appear to seek higher educational attainment partly in order to gain access to public sector jobs. Indeed, the share of employment in the public sector increases dramatically with level of educational attainment. Such policies likely contribute to long wait periods and high unemployment rates among youth, especially young females.
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION
Young Syrians rely heavily on family connections to secure employment and assistance with housing and credit in preparation for marriage. But the availability of strong family support structures also may contribute to high youth unemployment by allowing young people more time to fi nd desirable jobs. Those young people who lack connections are at a disadvantage in terms of obtaining employment, especially good jobs. However, there is also evidence that family connections are not a requirement for obtaining good work. Educational attainment can provide a considerable measure of economic inclusion.
Among young women, there is some voluntary exclusion from the workforce. A majority indicate that their main goal in life is family and marriage. However, family refusal is the most cited reason for economic inactivity behind housework and childcare responsibilities. Family and social pressures to stay out of the labor force may be compounded if access to employment through informal family networks is withheld. It is diffi cult to separate involuntary from voluntary exclusion is such cases, as the two are related in complex ways not easily disentangled.
THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
The legal framework in Syria presents special challenges for youth in terms of economic inclusion. Rigid labor laws and regulations make private businesses reluctant to hire young people. High wages and benefi ts in the public sector contribute to queuing for public sector jobs.
One factor often associated with lower levels of youth employment and higher rates of youth unemployment is the minimum wage. As compared with other countries in the region, minimum wages in Syria are low. However, they appear to be binding on over one-third of workforce. A doubling of the minimum wage between 2001 and 2006 will likely make government jobs even more attractive if the private sector fails to abide by and pay the higher wage rates.
Faced with weak labor demand, youth may prefer trying to start their own businesses. Successful startups not only improve the livelihoods of young entrepreneurs, they also create jobs. By age 29, over 40 percent of young men in Syria were self-employed or had their own business. But years of heavy regulation of private sector activities contributed to an adverse business climate in the country. For young entrepreneurs, this is refl ected especially in terms of the large amounts of capital needed to start a business and limited access to credit through formal sources of fi nance.
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES
Syrian youth face a diffi cult transition to regular employment. High unemployment rates and long unemployment duration spells among young people are mainly the result of high labor supply pressures, weak labor demand in both the public and private sectors, and mismatches between the skills and geographic location of youth and the skills demanded by employers and their location. Some of these factors are transitory and are expected to ease in the near future. Access to housing and credit also appear to be limited for youth. Social norms appear to play a role in creating obstacles to the economic inclusion of young women.
Other areas for future research include:
Migration: One of the unexpected fi ndings of this study was lack of hard evidence that economic factors contribute substantially to the economic exclusion of Syrian youth. One reason for this may be that migration may be mitigating some of these factors. The most relevant migrant group is young poorly-educated Syrian workers in Lebanon.
Disenfranchised Groups: It also important to explore the situation faced by groups such as those without citizenship and refugees, like the 1.5 -2 million recent Iraqi refugees.
Good Jobs / Bad Jobs: Youth exclusion might not be taking place with respect to fi nding work, but rather to fi nding good jobs with higher wages and benefi ts, greater stability, and opportunities for advancement. Future research could focus on this distinction.
Voluntary / Non-voluntary Exclusion: Additional research could help determine why young women exclude themselves from the workforce. Most indicate that marriage and family are the main reason, but familial and social pressures are also cited.
Housing:
The inability to afford basic housing has important implications for the delay of marriage and dependency on family and employers and may be associated with youth economic exclusion. Household budget surveys could be used to study this issue. 
I. GROWING UP IN SYRIA
A cursory examination of the employment situation among young people in the Middle East suggests that youth are being excluded from fully participating in the economic activities of their societies. People aged 15-24 in the region have the highest unemployment rates of any region in the world -26 percent compared to a worldwide average of 14 percent and 20 percent in the next closest region, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 2 . Young people in the Middle East have the next-to-lowest labor force participation rates in the world -39 percent, nearly on a par with the 38 percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) -compared to a worldwide average of 55 percent (Crespi Tarantino, 2004; Kabbani and Omeira, 2007) .
Unemployment rates among young Middle Eastern men are the highest in the world, but only marginally more than SSA (23 compared to 22 percent). By contrast, unemployment rates among young Middle Eastern women are by far the highest in the world (33 compared to 20 percent in the next-closest region, EECA). Thus, unemployment rates among young women in the region are 44 percent higher than among young men compared to a worldwide ratio of close to one. Similarly, labor force participation rates of young men in are the next-to-lowest in the world after EECA, 53 percent compared to a worldwide average of 63 percent. By contrast, participation rates for young women are by far the lowest in the world -24 percent compared to a worldwide average of 46 percent -and less than half the rate for young men. Therefore, young women in the Middle East may be facing economic exclusion both as youth and as women. Given the apparent centrality of gender to the issue of exclusion in the region, we will integrate it throughout our analysis.
These fi gures suggest that young people in the Middle East are being economically excluded. But youth exclusion must be studied in comparison to adults. If adults were in a similar situation, there would be little point in focusing only on youth. Young people tend to have lower labor force participation and higher unemployment rates than adults because many either still are in school or are beginning the transition to work. Therefore, the issue is how relative employment outcomes differ across regions. Youth unemployment rates in the Middle East are 3.3 times higher than those for adults, which is cause for concern. But the ratio is less than the worldwide average of 3.5. The labor force participation rate of youth relative to adults is substantially lower than the worldwide average (0.66 compared to 0.79 percent), but not the lowest ratio in the world. The evidence of youth economic exclusion in the region is thus mixed and requires further investigation. This paper examines youth economic exclusion, focusing on Syria. Unemployment rates among young people in Syria, estimated at 26 percent in 2002, are very close to the regional average (Figure 1-1) . What distinguishes the Syrian case is that unemployment rates among youth are more than six times higher than those among adults. This is the highest ratio among Middle Eastern countries outside the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While this high ratio is the result of relatively low unemployment rates among Syrian adults (4 percent) compared to other Middle Eastern countries, it is nonetheless an indication of possible youth exclusion problems in Syria.
In addition, young women in Syria are less than half as likely to participate in the labor force compared to young men (30 compared to 67 percent) and nearly twice as likely to be unemployed (39 compared to 21 percent), further stressing the importance of focusing on gender in our analysis.
Syrian youth face a difficult transition to regular employment. High youth unemployment rates are mainly the result of high labor supply pressures, weak labor demand in both the public and private sectors, and mismatches between the skills and geographic location of youth and the skills demanded by employers and their location. Access to housing and credit appear to be limited for youth. Social norms appear to play a role in creating obstacles to the economic inclusion of young women.
It is worth noting at the outset that one of the main forces affecting economic opportunities for young people in Syria, and in the region generally is a large demographic wave that is moving through the population. In North Africa, the share of youth in the population reached a peak of 21.3 percent in 2002 and has started declining. In Southwest Asia, the share of youth peaked at 23.3 percent in 2004. In Syria, the share of youth in the population peaked at 25.4 percent in 2005. This "youth bulge" presents challenges in terms of creating enough jobs for incoming cohorts of young people. But it also creates a window of opportunity for lower dependency ratios to lead to greater savings and higher rates of economic growth (World Bank, 2004) . If the youth population is not able to fully participate in its economic sphere, it foregoes the chance to benefi t from this "demographic dividend." Section II of the paper presents a conceptual framework for our approach. We focus on three categories associated with economic exclusion: economic, social, and institutional. We argue that exclusion affects employment outcomes more as these dimensions interact. Section III discusses the economic context of Syria and presents key indicators of youth economic exclusion in Syria. We focus mainly on unemployment and inactivity rates.
In Sections IV, V, and VI we discuss each of the three dimensions presented in Section II. Section IV deals with the economic dimension of exclusion, focusing on the labor market. It also deals with access to housing, credit, and social and economic networks. Section V examines the social dimension of exclusion, focusing on personal, familial, and communal and social infl uences.
Section VI focuses on the institutional dimension, such as access to services, recent government interventions and reforms, and civil society programs that target youth. Section VII concludes and highlights potential areas for empirical research into youth exclusion in Syria and elsewhere. Kabbani & Kothari (2005) , ILO (2006a) , UNDP Lebanon (2007 Exclusion can be defi ned as the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partly excluded from full participation in the society in which they live (European Foundation, 1995) . Exclusion is an evolving concept in the academic literature, much of which highlights its multidimensional nature (for example, Estivill, 2003) . Some note that exclusion is essentially a process. Others have emphasized the distinction between voluntary and involuntary exclusion (Le Grand, 2003; Barry, 1998) . Many have focused on the connection between exclusion and inequality and poverty (Atkinson 1998; Gordon et al., 2000; Bossert et al., 2004) . In all cases, however, exclusion is a highly contextualized phenomenon. For the purpose of this project, we use the above defi nition from the European Foundation and examine economic exclusion in the context of youth in Syria. Our approach emphasizes the interaction among these dimensions.
Although the literature has provided a range of defi nitions of exclusion, there appears to be an agreement on the relative nature of exclusion. For example, Bossert et al. (2004) point out that, unlike poverty, there is no exclusion "line" below which a person is considered excluded. Atkinson (1998, p. 14) cites relativity as one of the basic elements of exclusion, arguing that someone's exclusion cannot be recognized "by looking at his or her circumstances in isolation." Throughout this paper, we compare youth to adults (to the extent that data are available) since our concern is the ability of Syrian youth to participate fully in its society's economy.
A combination of factors contributes to actual or potential economic exclusion. We present a conceptual model that focuses on three dimensions of factors potentially affecting economic exclusion: economic, social, and institutional ( The Economic Dimension: Includes factors related to the labor market that affect the degree to which youth have access to jobs as well as access to good jobs (characterized by high wages, high benefi ts, and potential for job advancement). Our study examines sector of employment, wage structures, and educational attainment Access to housing, credit, and poverty issues also are examined. The poor in Syria cannot afford to be unemployed. But they may be driven to accept low-wage, low-quality jobs in the informal sector that perpetuate economic exclusion for themselves and their families.
The Social Dimension: Includes the infl uence of personal, family, and community support structures on economic exclusion and social roles. Gender issues are particularly evident. Personal priorities and expectations of male and female youth in Syria regarding employment, social status and mobility, and marriage are all important issues linked to economic exclusion. There is little data on the role of these infl uences, limiting the possibility of a rigorous assessment. While community and neighborhood infl uences also are expected to have an effect, we have not found a way to assess them.
The Institutional Dimension: Includes social and public institutions that may affect youth exclusion. Syria's legal framework, especially its labor laws, social safety net, and social security are potentially important factors in this dimension. Social institutions, such as religious organizations and unions, poten-
tially also are important. We also consider access to services such as training and credit.
The concept behind this model is that exclusion takes hold when more than one dimension is highly involved. For example, suppose social factors are signifi cant in excluding youth in a particular country. If economic opportunities are abundant and institutions are supportive, then social factors alone may not have much of an effect. But if combined with one or both of the other two factors, the result may be substantial youth exclusion.
Even though education is a central element in the discussion, it seemed to be more of an outcome of exclusion, affected by other factors, rather than an exogenous factor in itself. Indeed, education can be considered as a resource to ease exclusion rather than a risk factor. Thus, we do not include a separate section on education, but rather integrate education and the school-to-work transition throughout the text. We adopt the same approach with gender.
In terms of indicators (outcomes) of economic exclusion, much of the literature focuses on unemployment and long-term unemployment. But high youth unemployment does not necessarily signify a lack of opportunities. It may also result from the availability of strong family support structures which allow young people to take more time to fi nd employment opportunities that offer a good fi t for their skills and a good opportunity for advancement (O'Higgins, 2003 ). This appears to be the case in Middle Eastern countries. We study a combination of employment variables, including unemployment, labor force participation, and inactivity. ing the past 20 years was largely the result of factor accumulation-capital formation in the oil sector and high labor force growth rates. An International Monetary Fund study found that total factor productivity actually declined during the 1980s and 1990s (IMF, 2003) .
III. KEY YOUTH EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES
Over the past fi ve years, the Syrian government has initiated a series of reforms to help the country move toward a "social market economy." The government has begun introducing public sector employment retrenchment policies, has removed barriers to private sector entry for most industries, has permitted the development of private secondary schools, universities, and banks, and has introduced legislation to reform the country's rigid labor laws. The government also is considering reducing subsidies on fuel oil and other commodities, but not before putting in place social safety nets. Indeed, the "social" part of the reform effort involves developing a strong network of social services and maintaining a central role for the state.
The government reform effort comes at a critical time. Syria faces a host of internal and external pressures, including the possibility that it will become a 0%   10  13  16  19  22  25  28  31  34  27  40  43  46  49  52  55  58  61  64 Inactive Student Employed Unemployed net oil importer within fi ve years. The Syrian labor market also faces substantial pressures as a result of the demographic pressures discussed earlier, sluggish labor demand, and deeply embedded rigidities leading to high youth unemployment and migration rates, with the chief destination for emigres Lebanon and the oil-rich Gulf states. Removing institutional barriers, whether labor laws or regulations of business operations (including access to credit), may increase entrepreneurial activity among youth and hence their ability to participate economically.
The education system in Syria is suspected of contributing to the current employment situation by failing to equip students with the skills demanded in the market. In response to this labor market situation, the Syrian government is considering a host of educational reforms in addition to economic reforms.
SCHOOL-TO-WORK TRANSITION
In 2002-2003, the Syrian school system was divided into primary (grades 1-6), preparatory (grades 7-9), vocational and general secondary (grades 10-12), and two-year technical intermediate institutes or four to fi ve-year universities. In 2004, the primary and preparatory levels were combined into single "basic" education level, and compulsory schooling was increased from grade 6 to grade 9. Students must take national exams at the end of their primary and their secondary schooling. These exams determine whether students continue to the next level and whether they are eligible for the general or vocational tracks, with the general tracks strongly preferred.
The education system in Syria has not been providing young people with the occupational skills they need to succeed in the job market, contributing to long unemployment durations and often requiring young people to accept lower wages and lower quality jobs that do not necessarily match their learned skills. The mismatch between the skills of job seekers and the needs of employers have contributed to low returns to education and created an incentive to drop out of school (Huitfeldt and Kabbani, 2007) . Occupational mismatch reduces opportunities for young people to participate in the economy in ways commensurate with their capabilities. In addition, limited training opportunities available to Syrian youth, 0%   10  13  16  19  22  25  28  31  34  27  40  43  46  49  52 55  58  61 64 Inactive Student Employed Unemployed both on and off the job, have led to lower occupational mobility and less ability to adapt to changing demands in the labor market.
The accumulating evidence of low labor productivity and low returns to education (IMF, 2003; Huitfeldt and Kabbani, 2007) have encouraged the Syrian government to initiate an extensive reform of the public education system. Public school curricula are being revised, textbooks are being rewritten, and teachers are undergoing additional training.
To capture various aspects of economic activity by age, the 10-64 year old population can be divided into four levels of activity: inactive, student (but not in the labor force), employed, and unemployed. "Inactive" refers to individuals who are not in the labor force or in school. Therefore, they are not employed, not actively looking for work, and not studying 3 .
Nearly 32 percent of young men between the ages of fi fteen to twenty-four were in school in 2001-02 (Figure 2 -2). At age ten, 98 percent of boys were in school. School enrollment begins to decline at age twelve, just after boys complete primary school. Over 90 percent of boys continue to be enrolled in school through preparatory school. There is a large drop in school enrollment rates just before and after a national exam taken at the end of preparatory school. Some boys linger in school afterward, either by starting secondary school, retaking the grade 9 exam, or enrolling in a private technical school. Nonetheless, school enrollment rates decline sharply between the ages of thirteen and eighteen as young men transition from school to work. Enrollment rates do not drop as sharply after the secondary school national exam, possibly becausemost boys receive additional schooling afterward or retake the secondary national exam.
The percentage of males in the labor force follows an upward trend beginning at age twelve, reaching more than 90 percent of the population at twenty-four. For young men, inactivity is scarcely visible and is about 1 to 2 percent overall for 15-29 year olds. For adult men, inactivity only really begins increasing among those over fortynine. Unemployed young men represent more than 3 percent of the male population between the ages of 13 and 29. The proportion of adult men over thirty who are unemployed is only about 1 percent. The share of the male population that is unemployed increases steadily after age thirteen and reaches a peak of 21 percent at the age of twenty-one before starting to decline to about 5 percent by the age of twenty-nine.
The trends among young women are very different. Nearly 30 percent of women between 15-24 years of age were in school in 2001-02 (Figure 3-3) . While this is only slightly less than enrollment rates for young men, trends are different. At age ten, 97 percent of young women are in school. This is only a slightly lower share than for young men. But after primary school, enrollment rates for young women drop more sharply than for young men, such that by age fourteen (the fi nal year of preparatory school) there is an 8 percentage point difference between sexes. Enrollment rates among young women then fall more slowly than for young men so that by the end of secondary school, at age eighteen, enrollment rates are again nearly even.
The major differences between the sexes are with respect to labor market outcomes. First, young women are far more likely to transition from school to inactivity than to the labor force. This does not mean that women are not busy with household activities, only that they are not active in the labor force. Labor market inactivity rates among women increase from 2 percent at age eleven to 24 percent by age fi fteen, to 43 percent by age nineteen, to 63 percent by age twentyfour, and to 73 percent by age twenty-nine. Inactivity rates continue steadily upward after that.
Female labor force participation rates increase starting at the same age as young men, reaching a peak of 34 percent at age twenty-three and declining steadily with age to about 5 percent by age sixty-four. Increases in labor force participation rates are accompanied by increases in unemployment, which reaches a peak of 13 percent of the female population by age twenty. While the share of unemployed women in the population is similar to the share among young men, that far fewer women are in the labor force means that unemployment rates among women is much higher than among men. 
INACTIVITY AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES
The above analysis presents labor market trends by age. But there are also important differences in labor force inactivity and participation rates with respect to educational attainment. To include university graduates in our estimates, we extend coverage in this section to include young people aged fi fteen through twenty-nine.
Ninety-nine percent of young men are active in the labor force or in school ( Sources: Kabbani & Kothari (2005) and ILO (2006a rates are lower among young women. Many of these differences are probably the result of including a higher share of urban youth in the SWTS.
Over 75 percent of unemployed youth had been searching for work for over a year (Figure 3-7) . Search times were similar across levels of educational attainment apart from post-secondary school graduates. Only one-half of post-secondary school graduates had been searching for longer than a year. Also, there were no signifi cant gender differences in terms of the share of the unemployed who had been searching for more than a year. Young people who encounter substantial diffi culties in fi nding decent employment may become discouraged and drop out of the labor force. Once they do, they no longer affect the unemployment rate, but if their decision was a result of exclusion from employment, it remains a cause for concern.
In sum, unemployment rates among Syrian youth are high compared to the worldwide average of 14 percent but not high compared to the region's average of 26 percent. But relative youth unemployment rates (compared to adults) are higher than the regional average. Indeed, the share of youth among the unemployed is the highest in the region. Further, a large majority of Syrian youth appear to spend more than a year searching for work. There is an important gender dimension, with young women having unemployment rates almost twice as high as young men.
These basic indicators point toward youth economic exclusion as being a potential problem in the country. But labor force participation and activity rates suggest a more complicated reality. Nearly all young men are actively engaged in the transition from school to work; inactivity rates are very low (1-2 percent). That few young men are discouraged from looking for work and nearly all are employed by the time they reach the age of thirty, despite high unemployment rates, suggests that economic exclusion may be taking place with respect to good jobs as opposed to, simply, jobs. Among young women, however, activity rates are less than 60 percent, suggesting potential barriers to labor market entry. Activity rates among young women increase dramatically with educational attainment, reaching over 80 percent among postsecondary school graduates. We begin our analysis with the economic dimension, primarily focusing on labor market indicators. We seek to examine the extent to which Syrian youth are able to obtain employment and "change their own lives" as compared to adults (Atkinson, 1998) . Access to employment in the context of studying exclusion also necessitates an analysis of the types of employment that youth have access to as low-wage, low-quality employment does not guarantee less economic exclusion of youth relative to adults (Ibid.). Factors associated with exclusion are generally demand related. Factors not associated with exclusion tend to be related to supply and occupational or geographic mismatches. We begin by considering several causes of high youth unemployment rates in Syria that are not necessarily related to exclusion.
HIGH YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
One of the principal factors potentially driving the high rates of youth unemployment is the pressure of a high labor supply. Between 1983 and 2003, it has been estimated that the number of youth in the labor market increased by about 5 percent a year, nearly doubling the young labor force (Figure 4-1) .
As more and more youth entered the labor force, they naturally had diffi culty fi nding employment in general, and high-quality, high-wage employment in particular, thus contributing to higher rates of unemployment during the 1990s and early 2000s.
The young labor force still was expected to increase after 2006, but at less than 2 percent annually. Thus, to the extent that labor supply pressures are contributing to the high rates of unemployment among youth, their effect is transitory and not a cause for long-term policy intervention. But shortterm intervention is required to ensure that today's young unemployed do not become tomorrow's adult unemployed.
By far the main factor driving these labor supply trends is demographic. Starting in the 1960s, persistently high fertility rates combined with lower infant mortality and higher life expectancy to raise the population growth in Syria as well as in other Middle Eaastern countries. As a result, the share of youth in the total population has been on the rise since the 1980s (Figure 4-2) . In fact, the fi fteen to twenty-nine age group peaked at 32 percent of the total population in 2005, up from 27 percent in One factor that has infl uenced the labor supply is increases in female labor force participation rates. Those rates doubled between 1980 and 2005, but from very low initial rates. The annual increase was about 0.5 percent a year. This increase accounts for only about 15 percent of the labor supply (Kabbani and Tzannatos, 2006) . But because women gravitate toward specifi c occupations, it is likely that the higher participation of women in the workforce affected the employment prospects of women in female-oriented occupations, helping to explain the observed gender differences in unemployment rates.
IV. EXCLUSION AND THE LABOR MARKET
Another factor affecting youth unemployment rates is the degree of internal and international migration. Emigration by Syrian youth to other countries means less competition for jobs in Syria, both for youth and adults. But higher migration within Syria results in higher competition for jobs in specifi c areas of the country and less in others. While data limitations prevent a detailed examination of this issue, some estimates exist. Another factor that affects the size of the labor force and unemployment is educational attainment. An increase in the average enrollment rates at all levels of schooling can reduce labor force participation and competition during that year of increase. For the effect to be permanent, however, governments must fi nd ways of increasing economic growth and job creation in occupations that require higher levels of education. Trends of primary and secondary school enrollment have differed since the 1970s. Kabbani and Tzannatos (2006) Both primary and secondary school enrollments increased between 1970 and the mid-1980s ( Figure  3-3) . The former continued its upward trend to about 95 percent for girls and about 100 percent for boys by 2004. The latter, however, began declining after the mid-1980s to below 40 percent for young boys and girls.
Before 2001, the public university system was the sole provider of higher education and was therefore operating above capacity. This caused the government to restrict entry into universities by increasing vocational secondary school enrollment. Most vocational secondary school students are prevented from entering public universities, resulting in a perception among students of a dead-end in terms of education. 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 Primary Secondary
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Not only does educational attainment affect youth exclusion by increasing unemployment rates, the quality of this education and the skills that it equips youth with undoubtedly affect their labor market outcomes.
EDUCATION, SKILLS MISMATCHES AND JOB TYPES
The connection between education and labor market outcomes is well examined in the literature.
Although economic independence is delayed by higher education, (Schneider, 1999) , such education is thought to be of greater importance than early work experience with respect to higher wages later in life (Donahoe and Tienda, 2000; Hotz et al., 1999) . Early work experience has a positive impact on later employment opportunities and wages. But work experience, provided the time allocated to work is not given a higher priority over education, is more benefi cial when combined with more formal educational attainment (Ibid.). Further, research suggests that the skill level of basic and vocational school education have not matched the higher skill levels demanded in the labor market (Bailey 1991; Levitan and Gallo 1991; Lynch 1994; Stedman 1998 in Donahoe and Tienda, 2000) .
Empirical evidence about Syria found that returns to education increase with the level of schooling. But the returns are rather fl at (Huitfeld and . This may be because of the high level of public sector employment in Syria (and the Middle East) compared with other developing regions of the world; government pay scales rather than productivity determine higher returns (Pritchett, 1999; Glewwe, 2002; World Bank, 2004) . Although the fl at structure of wage returns to education may encourage students to drop out, Syrian youth appear to seek higher education partly in order to gain employment in the public sector. Indeed, the share of employment in the public sector increases steadily and dramatically with the level of educational attainment ( Figure 4-4) , from 7 percent of illiterate men and 4 percent of illiterate women to 86 percent of both men and women with university degrees.
Young women are especially attracted to public sector jobs because wages for them are higher than in the private sector and benefi ts are more generous, including those for maternity leave. Most young men also prefer jobs in the public sector, but wages for them are on par with the Street, Kabbani and Al-Oraibi (2006) private sector. The main benefi t seems to be job security and benefi ts.
As confi rmation of a preference for public sector jobs, over 80 percent of unemployed youths in Syria (age fi fteen to twenty-nine) in 2003 indicated that they were interested in a public sector job and nearly 60 percent indicated that they were interested in a job exclusively in the public sector. By comparison, only 34 percent were interested in a private sector job and 9 percent wanted a job exclusively in the private sector. Only 14 percent were interested in self-employment or owning a business. Unemployed young women were more interested than young men in public sector employment and less interested in self-employment or owning a business. Nearly 90 percent of unemployed young women were looking for a public sector job and 70 percent were looking for a job exclusively in the public sector (Huitfeld and .
To gain additional insight into the transition from school to work, we examined the distribution of employment across fi ve job types between the ages of fi fteen and twenty-nine: public sector employment, private sector employment, business ownership, self-employment, and unpaid work (Figure 4 -5). This does not necessarily show the actual transitions of individuals, since people at age fi fteen may follow different employment trajectories than do older cohorts. At fi fteen, most male workers either are engaged in unpaid (mostly farm) work or working in the private sector. As more young men leave school and fi nd work, they accept private sector jobs. Opportunities in the public sector begin at age eighteen and its share increases to about 25 percent by twenty-nine. Interestingly, the share of young men who are self-employed or have their own businesses increases with age, jointly reaching close to 40 percent of male workers by age twentynine. These large percentages point to signifi cant increases in entrepreneurial activity among young Syrian men.
Employment trends among young working women are again quite different. At age 15, nearly 80 percent of working girls are engaged in unpaid (mostly farm) work. The share of female workers employed in private sector jobs hovers at about 15 percent across all ages. The share in self-employment is about 5 percent, reaching a peak of 10 percent In terms of paid work, the common denominator across age groups is that public sector employment increases at the expense of formal private sector employment. Employment in the informal private sector declines with age group, but not by much (Figure 4-6) . Among young men, employment in the informal sector declines from 38 percent among 15-19 year olds to 29 percent among 45-64 year olds. Among young women, employment in the informal sector declines more sharply by age group, but then increases among 45-64 year olds. Age therefore does not appear to be a main determinant of working in the informal economy.
Educational attainment has a much stronger association with employment in the informal sector than do age groups (Figure 3-6 ). For young men, employment in the informal sector falls steadily from 42 percent of illiterate paid workers to 10 percent of secondary school graduates to 1 percent of university graduates. For young women, the decline is even sharper, from an initially higher fi gure of 68 percent among illiterate young women to 8 percent among secondary school graduates to 1 percent of university graduates.
Unemployment duration is signifi cant to youth exclusion. Not only might higher unemployment spells result in youth exclusion, they also have a negative impact on future labor market outcomes since youth can "unlearn" by "not doing" (Sen, 2000) . That results in a decrease in skills and future exclusion from employment generally and good (high quality, high wage) jobs. Bradley et al. (2003) focus on transitions among fi ve states: high skilled employment, intermediate skilled employment, low skilled employment, unemployment, and out of the labor force. They claim that there are two groups: those who are relatively "trapped" in the last three states causing them to be more prone to social exclusion, and those in the two higher levels that are more "immune" to social exclusion. Although our There is little direct evidence about the length and nature of unemployment periods in Syria. In the previous section, we noted that about 75 percent of young job seekers (employed and unemployed) with a secondary degree or less compared to about 50 percent of post-secondary school graduates had been seeking a job for a duration of more than a year (Figure 3-7) . Further, indirect evidence suggests that unemployment duration generally drops with the level of educational attainment (Huitfeldt and Kabbani, 2007) . What is not clear is the extent to which long unemployment spells are the result of a mismatch between the skills of workers and needs of employers, a lack of jobs in general, or the result of queuing for public sector jobs, as has happened in other countries of the region such as Egypt (Assaad, 1997) and Morocco (Boudarbat, 2004) .
That periods of unemployment are extensive among youth at all levels of educational attainment suggests a combination of occupational mismatch and weak labor demand. Earlier, we reviewed evidence that the education system in Syria does not appear to be equipping students with the skills demanded in the labor market. The remedy in this case is to reform the education system, which the government is doing by allowing private institutions to open, improving the public education curricula, and retraining teachers. We do not have evidence that is as direct on the state of labor demand. Still, weak demand is consistent with much observed evidence, such as heavy state regulation, high migration rates, and high levels of youth unemployment. In the presence of weak labor demand, more educated workers may accept jobs that could have gone to less educated workers and they are more able to migrate to other countries, thereby reducing crowding in their specifi c occupations.
As previously noted, most unemployed young people indicated a strong preference for public sector jobs, with their job security and higher benefi ts, especially for women. In addition, young educated workers, who have the greatest access to public sector employment, appear to have shorter unemployment periods than those with lower educational credentials, who potentially have to wait longer. In line with its economic reform agenda, the Syrian government has begun introducing public sector employment retrenchment policies and has allowed private sector competition in many sectors that were previously state dominated. If the demographic window of opportunity is to be taken advantage of, suffi cient jobs need to be created for the large numbers of young labor market entrants (World Bank, 2004) . The government has taken steps to strengthen the private sector and encourage entrepreneurship to increase the capacity of the private sector to absorb the young labor market entrants.
HOUSING ACCESS
A study of eight Middle Eastern countries conducted by the World Bank found affordability to be one of the major problems in getting access to housing. The study measured housing affordability by the ratio of house price to an individual's income. In Morocco, Lebanon, and Algeria, a middle-income household needs about nine years to be able to purchase an average home in the major cities, provided the household saves its entire income. The situation was worse for lower income households. Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan had relatively cheaper housing (Baharaglu et al., 2005) .
Access to housing in Syria is also restricted by high costs. Data on housing prices are limited, but some estimates exist. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, a 100-square-meter property in urban Damascus was priced between 2 million and 4 million Syrian Pounds ($40,000 to $80,000) (Al Thawra, 2004 in Syria Report, 2004 . Average salaries for young people in Syria are between 5,000 SP and 10,000 SP (about $95 and $195) . Following the measure used by Baharaglu et al. (2005), a young employee needs to save his or her entire income for sixteen to thirty-three years to be able to purchase property in urban areas in Damascus at the lower range of property prices. Property prices in rural areas of Damascus, however, were half the cost of those in urban areas. Khawaja (2002) explains that migration from rural to urban areas in Syria may be low in part because of the high cost of urban housing relative to rural housing. Report, 2005; 2007) . Many housing units are available but unoccupied because of a lack of affordability, and the new law is expected to end informal or illegal settlements and increase the supply of cheaper housing (Syria Report, 2007) .
The existence of informal settlements and some degree of exclusion from formal housing are issues that merit concern. In Egypt, where informal housing is common, the ratio of informal to formal settlements was used to refl ect access to formal housing (Baharoglu et al., 2005) . While informal housing is also prevalent in Syria, we do not have data to compute such a ratio. Until the enactment of the law restricting illegal construction, informal settlements certainly increased in large cities and suburbs of the Capital (Syria Report, 2004 ).
The high cost of buying or renting formal housing units, limited access to credit, and recent restrictions on the construction of informal units have combined to exclude young people from accessing housing without the fi nancial support of their families. Since young men are expected to provide housing in the event of marriage, the priority of families is to support their male children. Most young women, therefore, are dependent on their parents or husbands for access to shelter. Young men from low-income families have little choice but to rely on charity, delay marriage or obtain housing at a signifi cant distance from urban centers. This last option may be creating geographical mismatches between the locations of available employment opportunities and where young people live, contributing to higher youth unemployment rates.
In sum, many of the economic reasons for employment outcomes for youth potentially can be explained by factors that are not necessarily related to exclusion. These include demographic trends, labor supply pressures, and government education policies. Other elements may be more structural, including skills mismatches, weak demand, public sector employment policies, and lack of access to affordable housing in urban centers. The Syrian government is taking steps to encourage labor demand in the private sector and reform the education system. But access to housing remains a concern and is an important area for future research, especially in light of increasing costs and new laws that restrict the construction of unlicensed housing units. Another area where little is known is migrant youth, especially less educated young workers in Lebanon. This group does not show up in government statistics except as inactive youth temporarily back from seasonal jobs. Future research would be needed to shed light on this important group.
Personal attitudes, family circumstances, and social infl uences all potentially play a role in the economic exclusion of youth. In this section, we discuss the effect of these factors on the labor force outcomes of young people in Syria. There is little data available that could shed light on these issues. But we were able to make use of data from the 2005 School-to-Work Transition Survey (SWTS) to examine some of the topics in depth.
Personal attitudes and choice play an important role in determining unemployment and labor force participation. Entry into the labor force and accepting a job are choices that many young Syrians have to make, especially young women. However, care must be taken in interpreting unemployment and labor force inactivity in terms of voluntary exclusion. Le Grand (2003) and Barry (1998) advise caution when analyzing voluntary exclusion because the quality of choices available and the information that the decisions are based on may not warrant considering the exclusion to be truly voluntary. Further, there is concern that if a group excludes itself voluntarily, it may not be able to return to society (Barry, 1998) .
Young people from low-income households have little choice but to work to support themselves and their families. Those from middle-or high-income families can afford to be more selective in their labor market choices and to wait for a good job.
Research also has suggested that the relationship between children's unemployment and that of their parents may be the result of the "handing down" of tastes and constraints by the parents (O'Neill and Sweetman, 1998). Thus, unemployment among young people is not only decided by labor market conditions and employment availability but also by personal choices linked to family circumstances.
Family support is also important, in ways distinct from familial circumstances. Young Syrians rely heavily on family connections to secure employment and assist with housing and credit in preparation for marriage. But the availability of strong family support structures also may contribute to high youth unemployment rates by allowing young people more time to fi nd employment opportunities that offer a good fi t for their skills and a good opportunity for advancement (O'Higgins, 2003) . Marriage decisions are strongly infl uenced by family. Marriage in Arab countries is still viewed as a "social and economic contract between two families" and marriage costs, most importantly housing, are usually expected of and supplied by the groom and his family (Rashad et al., 2005) . Such expectations contribute to assortative mating (Chadwick and Solon, 2002) . Family status, as refl ected by earnings and reputation (communicated through social networks), play a role in marriage in Syria. Marriage, in a sense, may be a medium for both sustaining economic and social status and transitioning to a higher level. In addition, since many young women, and their families, expect husbands to be responsible for earning income and providing housing, young wives may exit the labor force after marriage, even if they were previously employed.
V. EXCLUSION AND THE INFLUENCE OF FAMILY AND SOCIETY
Finally, research suggests that community and neighborhood may be key factors related to youth exclusion. Two elements affecting exclusion, according to socioeconomic literature, are informal job networks and the existence, or lack, of positive role models (O'Regan and Quigley, 1998) . Proximity to work locations affects the ability to fi nd employment (Vipond, 1984) . This is especially true for young women in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, who may want, or feel obliged, to fi nd jobs close to their homes (Assaad and Arntz, 2005) . Other studies suggest that poor neighborhoods contribute to high rates of unemployment (Hunter, 1996) .
SYRIAN YOUTH'S PRIORITIES
In considering the infl uence of personal attitudes in defi ning a set of alternatives for youth, we begin with a look at their priorities. According to the SWTS data, nearly 40 percent of young men identifi ed work as the most important goal in their lives compared with only about 12 percent of women (Figure 4-1) . By contrast, more than 50 percent of young women ranked family and marriage as their most important goal in life compared with 25 percent of young men. An almost equal percentage placed education as most important. These results may help explain the differences between labor force participation and inactivity rates for young men and women.
Priorities of youth are certainly infl uenced by their families and the environment in which they were (Moghadam, 2005) . Many young women in Syria no longer are raised to become merely good mothers and wives. But, as the data suggest, more young women still prioritize marriage and family, and the effect of traditions and societal norms in Syria remain an important determinant of the gender division of labor.
As previously observed, inactivity among young women in Syria is quite high. The main causes of female inactivity appear to be family related. Housework and child care were the main reasons for inactivity given among 44 percent of economically inactive young women. About one-third of inactive young women indicated that the primary reason for their inactivity was family refusal to allow them to work or to search for work. This represents our fi rst piece of empirical evidence of economic exclusion along social dimensions. Less than 10 percent of economically inactive young women cited lack of jobs as a main reason for their inactivity. The inactivity rate among young men in the SWTS was only 6 percent. Thus, care must be taken in inferring reasons for their inactivity. Still, the most frequently given reason (about 30 percent) was health. Interestingly, only 17 percent indicated that the lack of job opportunities or suitable jobs were the main reason ( Figure 5-2) .
Among unemployed youth, the SWTS asked about the diffi culties encountered in searching for a job.
More than 90 percent of those surveyed replied that they rely on help from family, relatives and friends ( Figure 5-3) . The second most frequently used job search strategy was visiting establishments directly, with 87 percent indicating that they used this method. These results highlight the limited use of more formal institutions and methods in searching for a job, such as public employment offi ces or the media. Less than 10 percent of youths who were employed in a non-career or temporary job at the time of the survey were registered with an employment 
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offi ce and only 8 percent of those who were registered received career guidance or advice.
5
The survey results also highlight the importance of family or social connections in looking for work. Indeed, among those who completed their transition from school to work, meaning that they found a job with a long-term contract or have not claimed a desire to change jobs (ILO, 2007) , a majority (54 percent) found their current job through friends and family. The second most common strategy for fi nding a stable job was through a training institution (21 percent) followed by visiting the establishment directly (9 percent). Other methods, including more formal job searches through media outlets or government employment offi ces, account for only 2 to 3 percent of successful transitions (Ibid.).
The lack of family or social connections may present a substantial barrier to obtaining stable employment, or a good job, and is a potential source of social and economic exclusion. But schooling and personal initiative (receiving training and visiting establishments) potentially can mitigate defi cits in social-familial connections. The importance of family and social connections has special relevance for young women interested in working or looking for work. As noted above, one of the barriers to participating in the labor force is family refusal. If family refusal extends to withholding access to job contacts, then exclusionary factors compound the creation of barriers that are far more diffi cult for young women to surmount.
Formal job searches are not a strategy of choice. Even public employment offi ces are rife with those seeking to gain employment through connections. Few private companies list vacancies with employment offi ces (although, they are required by law to do so) because of the widespread belief that the offi ces propose job candidates for vacant positions based on connections rather than qualifi cations or place in line. Those seeking public sector jobs must register with employment offi ces, but candidates often are selected by government agencies based on factors other than their place in the job queue (Kabbani and Tzannatos, 2006).
SEEKING EMPLOYMENT
Young people encounter a signifi cant number of diffi culties in searching for a job. Lack of educa- . This diffi culty is followed by lack of experience and then by job scarcity, which represent only 16 percent of total responses. Lack of networks and connections (12 percent) and poor working conditions and wages (9 percent) were the fi nal main responses.
The number of responses by young women in the survey is too small to allow a detailed breakdown by gender. But the overall distribution of responses is fairly similar across gender, with young women slightly more likely to cite poor working conditions and wages and slightly less likely to cite lack of education as the main obstacles to fi nding a job.
That only 12 percent of responses indicated lack of social networks as the chief barrier to fi nding a job is interesting given the high share of young people who rely on such networks to fi nd stable employment. The results seem to indicate that youth recognize that lack of suitable education is the primary obstacle to fi nding work and that family connections are needed to overcome this difficulty. Indeed, the vast majority (over 90 percent) of employed youth indicated that they did not receive training related to their specifi c employment (SWTS, 2007) .
The link between "social capital," which includes social networks and relations, and exclusion is ambiguous. But recent research suggests that social capital may result in the partial exclusion of some groups and the inclusion of others (Field et al., 2000) . The importance of informal networks in the job search process in Syria suggests that young people without such connections have lower chances of obtaining employment and are likely to be economically excluded. But receiving an education that is useful and relevant to available job opportunities appears to be more than simply a mitigating strategy; rather, it is the primary strategy that, if successfully completed, would overcome any network shortcomings.
Finally, marriage is also important in the context of economic exclusion and is linked in complex ways to employment, social status, and access to housing. Although the average age at the time of fi rst marriage has increased in Arab countries, including Syria, the percentage of married youth is still considerable (Rashad et al., 2005) . Moghadam (2005) attributes most of the increases in the age of marriage to increases in educational attainment in the region, including Syria. In Syria, 11 percent of women fi fteen to nineteen and 40 percent of women twenty to twenty-four were married in 2001 (Pan-Arab project for Family Health in Rashad et al., 2005) .
In sum, young people in Syria rely heavily on family and social connections in order to look for and obtain stable employment. Young people who lack such connections are at a disadvantage in terms of obtaining employment, especially good jobs. But there also is evidence that family connections are not a requirement for obtaining good work. Educational attainment can provide a considerable measure of economic inclusion. Further, taking personal initiative by visiting establishments seems to be more effective than pursuing more formal job search options.
For young women, there is evidence of some measure of voluntary exclusion from the workforce. A majority indicated that their main goal in life is family and marriage. But family refusal is given as the second reason for economic inactivity behind housework and childcare responsibilities. As such, there is evidence of familial and social pressures to stay out of the labor force, which may be compounded if access to employment through informal networks is withheld. It would be diffi cult to separate voluntary from involuntary exclusion is such cases as the two are related in complex ways not easily disentangled.
The fi nal set of factors potentially associated with youth exclusion are social and public institutions. Institutions are defi ned broadly to include laws and regulations, unions and nongovernmental organizations, and access to services. While institutions are potentially important, we do not have data to empirically examine their infl uence on young people. Most of the available information is not even youth specifi c but rather applies to all age groups.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYEES
Nearly 90 percent of young Syrians use informal methods to search for a job such as help from families, relatives, and friends, and more than 50 percent who successfully transition to a career position and found a job through informal networks. Public sector vacancies do not escape this informal mechanism. Although by law these vacancies should be fi lled through a testing mechanism that grades applicants according to their qualifi cations (SEBC, 2003) , in reality informal connections play a major role in securing jobs in the public sector. Dismissal of public sector employees is very diffi cult once they are granted "fi xed contracts," which occurs after they have completed a yearlong training period (Article 17 of Law No. 50).
Secure employment for public sector workers, attractive government wages and benefi t packages compared to the private sector, and a government initiative to limit the growth of public sector employment have combined to encourage job seekers to line up for government jobs. As a result, the share of paid employees in the public sector increases with age (Figure 4-6 ).
Private sector workers are covered under laws dating back more than four decades. Private sector "training" only lasts a maximum of three months. After an employee completes this probationary training period, dismissal is diffi cult (SEBC, 2003) . An annual World Bank survey of the business climate in 175 countries fi nds that it is rather easy to hire workers and set hours of work in Syria. But it is signifi cantly more diffi cult and costly to fi re workers compared to the region generally. Dismissing workers in the Middle East also is more diffi cult and costly compared to developed economies. Thus, Syria is very uncompetitive in this aspect of doing business.
MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION
One factor often associated with lower levels of youth employment and higher rates of youth unem- Source: World Bank (2006) ployment is the minimum wage. A survey of industrialized countries by Neumark and Wascher (2004) found that minimum wages are associated with minor negative effects on youth employment. But the effects of minimum wage can differ substantially among countries according to their labor market institutions, economic conditions, and the number of people to whom it applies. Among developing countries, research is limited because the value of the minimum wage often is too low to have much of an effect, compliance often is a problem, and data are not always available (Ghellab, 1998) . The limited evidence suggests a weak negative impact on youth employment in some cases and no signifi cant effect in others (O'Higgins, 2003; Ghellab, 1998) . For Indonesia, Rama (1996) found that doubling the minimum wage led to a 2 percent decrease in wage employment, with effects concentrated among small fi rms. Similar fi ndings were obtained by Alatas and Cameron (2003) .
VI. INSTITUTIONS AND SERVICES
In Syria, the minimum wage differs according to sectors and occupations. (Table  3) . Compliance with minimum wage laws is likely to be higher in the public sector.
Minimum wage differences between the private and public sectors in 2001-02 likely increased the attraction of government jobs, which was counter to the government's stated objective of limiting employment growth in the public sector. The recent unifi cation of minimum wages across sectors could balance the attraction of private sector jobs. Given compliance problems, however, the higher private sector minimum wage is likely to increase the size of the informal sector, which may become an increasing source of jobs for entering cohorts of young workers. Kothari, 2005) . When it was set at 3,500 SP (about $70) per month, the minimum wage was estimated to be binding on about 15 percent of workers (Kabbani and Tzannatos, 2007) . At current levels, the minimum wage may be binding on over one-third of workers. Since compliance is weak in the private sector, however -especially given the size of the informal economythe biggest impact the minimum wage may have is on public fi nances and unemployment because it will increase the number of applicants for government jobs. A reduction in the highest corporate tax bracket from 65 percent to 35 percent in 2003 has been associated with a positive effect on investment (Syria Report, 2003) . Still, tax administration remains cumbersome and time consuming. Such bureaucratic obstacles have encouraged many entrepreneurs to choose to operate in the informal economy (Kabbani and Tzannatos, 2007) .
CHALLENGES TO STARTING A BUSINESS
Restrictions to private sector entry have been removed for most industries in Syria. Regulations of the private sector are being pared with the intention of producing an environment that is more conducive to private sector growth, including higher foreign investment and creating more employment opportunities. A major reform was introduced in 2000 when the government revised the key Investment Law Number 10. The changes provide addi- Source: World Bank (2006) tional incentives for export industries, fi rms that locate in less-industrialized regions of the country, and companies willing to hire large numbers of workers and register them with the social services agency. While these incentives possibly will strengthen the private sector, they may not increase employment because less than 6 percent of the total number of registered workers in the industrial private sector worked for fi rms that operated under Law Number 10. Sixty percent of registered workers were employed by small fi rms registered under Law 47 (Kabbani and Tzannatos, 2006) .
Rank
One of the primary public institutions to create jobs and lower unemployment rates was the Agency for Combating Unemployment (ACU), which was established in 2002. The chief activity of the ACU was the administration of two loan programs, one targeting small and medium-sized enterprises and one for low-income families (micro-enterprise loans). ACU also operated public works and training programs (Kabbani and Tzannatos, 2007) . It had a fi ve-year mandate to create 440,000 jobs by 2007, with a budget of $1 billion. It was criticized when it failed to meet these targets (Syria Report, 2006) and subsequently was replaced by a permanent agency, the Public Commission for Employment and Projects Development (PCEPD). The SWTS data suggest that few young people benefi ted from ACU in terms of looking for and fi nding jobs. The PCEPD will focus on two programs: training and business incubators (Syria Report, 2006 ; personal communication with the ministry; ACU Newsletter, September 2006). It is diffi cult to assess how successful PCEPD will be in alleviating youth unemployment in the country.
ACCESS TO CREDIT
Access to credit remains a problem in Syria. The World Bank's indicators suggest that Syria is far below Middle Eastern and worldwide averages in terms of information pertaining to credit ( What distinguishes the Syrian case is that youth unemployment rates relative to those of adults are higher than all other Middle Eastern countries except for Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the share of youth among the unemployed in Syria is among the highest in the region. In addition, a large majority of Syrian youths spend more than a year searching for work. Unemployment in Syria is essentially a youth issue and suggests the presence of high levels of youth economic exclusion in the country.
There is an important gender dimension to the unemployment story, with unemployment rates among young women almost twice as high as those among young men. In addition, 50 percent of young women in Syria (age fi fteen to twenty-nine) are neither in the labor force nor in school, suggesting potential barriers to labor market entry. Unemployment rates and inactivity rates among young women point to economic exclusion as a potentially important issue in this group.
The employment indicators for Syria are mixed. Compared to other countries in the region, the high rates of relative youth unemployment have more to do with low unemployment rates among adults than with high rates among youths. In addition, nearly all young men are actively engaged in the transition from school to work; inactivity rates are only 1 to 2 percent. Activity rates among young women increase dramatically with educational attainment, reaching over 80 percent among post-secondary school graduates. Thus, economic exclusion may not be a solid barrier to young people in transition but rather one that can be surmounted with time, effort, and resources. The evidence presented in this paper, for the most part, supports this view.
This paper studied youth exclusion in three categories: economic, social, and institutional. Many of the economic factors associated with youth employment outcomes seem to be transient and not necessarily related to exclusion. These include demographic trends, female labor supply pressures, and government education policies. Some factors appear to be more structural, including skills mismatches, weak demand, public sector employment policies, and limited access to affordable housing in urban centers. The Syrian government is supporting private sector development to spur labor demand and is reforming the education system. While there was little evidence of a lack of employment opportunities -only of a lack of good employment opportunities -the crucial issue of youth migration remained unaddressed for lack of data.
Social factors appear to be an important element in studying of youth exclusion in Syria. Young people rely heavily on family and social connections to look for and obtain stable jobs, especially good jobs. But educational attainment also can buy a measure of economic inclusion. Also, taking personal initiative seems to be rewarded. Indeed, that nearly all young men are employed by the time they reach the age of 30 suggests that economic exclusion may not be taking place so much with respect to fi nding a job as with respect to fi nding a good job (stable, high wage, high benefi ts). For young women, there is evidence of some measure of voluntary exclusion from the workforce. A majority indicate that their main goal in life is family and marriage. But family refusal is the second most common reason for economic inactivity. It would be diffi cult to separate voluntary from involuntary exclusion is such cases since the two are related in complex ways not easily disentangled.
Institutional elements appear likely to be associated with youth exclusion. Rigid labor laws and regulations may make businesses reluctant to hire young workers. High wages and benefi ts in the public sector contribute to queuing for public sector jobs. The doubling of a binding minimum wage between 2001 and 2006 may make government jobs even more attractive if the private sector fails to pay the minimum. Also, young people who want to become self-employed or to start their own businesses face a weak business climate, especially in terms of the capital needed to start a business and limited access to credit. We were not able to assess the impact of these institutional factors on youth employment outcomes directly. But their impact largely depends on the extent to which they effectively bind private sector activities.
We suggest that exclusion takes hold when more than one dimension is highly involved. Thus, multiple risk factors associated with youth exclusion add to one another such that they have a stronger cumulative effect than they would individually. We were not able to test this hypothesis directly, but we looked for evidence that was consistent with its implications. One example was with respect to female labor force participation. We identifi ed two social factors that were potentially associated with economic exclusion in Syria: the reliance on family connections to secure employment and that a high share of young females indicated they were inactive because their families did not want them to work or to look for work. Each of these factors on its own may contribute to reduced economic participation for young women. But, combined, the two factors potentially have a stronger exclusionary effect. A young woman may decide to go against her family's wishes and look for a job. But the task becomes much more diffi cult if she needs their help and connections to secure a job.
FUTURE POLICY RESEARCH
This paper touched on many issues that potentially affect youth exclusion in Syria. But many more questions were raised or remain unanswered. Here are some of the main areas in which future research may be warranted. We emphasize the issues that can potentially be addressed using existing data and others that would require the collection of new primary data.
Migration:
One of the unexpected fi ndings was lack of evidence that economic factors contribute
• to economic exclusion of youth in Syria. Additional analysis should be conducted on this issue, especially given the long unemployment durations observed. One factor that may be contributing to the lack of evidence is migration. Young people are leaving Syria in large numbers for jobs, mainly to neighboring Lebanon and the Gulf states. Most migrants are not covered in surveys and so their experiences are not recorded. Migration also eases labor supply pressures facing young people who stay behind, improving their chances for employment. Thus, migration may be hiding signifi cant economic factors associated with youth exclusion. In the Syrian context, the most relevant migrant group is arguably young (mostly low-educated) workers in Lebanon. This group does not show up in government statistics except as inactive youth temporarily back from seasonal jobs. There would be much value in studying Syrian migrants in Lebanon. A research effort that includes respondents from both sides of the border would potentially yield valuable information on the push and pull factors associated with the decision to work in Lebanon. Further, it may be of interest for future studies to explore the situation faced by disenfranchised groups such as refugees and groups without citizenship.
Good Jobs/Bad Jobs: We hypothesized throughout this paper that youth exclusion might not be taking place with respect to fi nding work but rather with respect to fi nding good jobs. Good jobs are more stable, have higher wages and benefi ts, and include opportunities for professional 
Lack of Panel Data:
Our fi ndings suggest that attitudes affect labor market outcomes. Whether
• •
these attitudes translate into behavior later in life or whether they refl ect an attempt, after the fact, to rationalize employment outcomes is an important issue that cannot be determined with available data. In fact, in order to truly shed light on how family circumstances and personal attitudes play a role in determining labor force outcomes, the use of longitudinal data that begins before young people begin the transition to work and adulthood is needed. Such data would help shed valuable light on many other aspects of youth exclusion and the school-to-work transition. We are not aware of any Middle Eastern country for which such data are available.
Housing: Another important area of research is access to housing, especially in light of increasing costs and new laws that restrict the construction of unlicensed housing units. The inability to afford basic housing has important implications for the delay of marriage and dependency on family and employers and may be a huge economic issue associated with youth economic exclusion. Undertaking this analysis would require the use of household income and expenditure survey data.
• 2. We adopt the most wieldy used defi nition of youth: those between the ages of fi fteen to twenty-four, noting that some young people begin the transitions to work and adulthood at earlier ages and some (such as university graduates) at later ages. We will expand the range of ages under analysis when there is a need and data is available.
3. Other sources in the literature include students among the economically "inactive" population. We fi nd it more conceptually convenient for our analysis to include them among the "active" groups.
4. We recently obtained preliminary results from the 2005 Labor Force Survey. These data have not yet been published internationally. Further, we do not have access to detailed tabulations to do the types of analysis we are able to do using the 2001 and 2002 data. We therefore rely on these earlier surveys in our reporting.
5. A career job in the SWTS is one that is in line with a person's desired career path. A noncareer job is associated with a degree of dissatisfaction and is assumed to be a result of lack of better options. A temporary job, as the title suggests, is one of limited duration (ILO, 2007) .
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The research framework focuses on youth making two major transitions to adulthood: i) the transition from education to employment; and ii) the transition to household formation (marriage and family). Research will concentrate on strategies to achieve inclusion in:
Quality education Our goal is to examine the relationship between economic and social policies and generate new recommendations that promote inclusion.
Advocacy and Networking: Creating Vital Connections
The initiative aspires to be a hub for knowledge and ideas, open to all stakeholders who can make change happen. Strong partnerships with policymakers, government offi cials, representatives from the private sector and civil society organizations, donors and the media will pioneer forms of dialogue that bridge the divide between ideas and action. By bringing in the voice and new perspectives of young people, the initiative will revitalize debate on development in the Middle East.
Practical Action: Life-Changing Impact
Outcomes matter. With a focus on areas with the greatest potential for innovation and impact, the initiative will mobilize partners for practical action that can improve young people's lives. The initiative will help develop policies and program interventions which provide youth with skills, expand opportunities for employment and facilitate access to credit, housing and civic participation. The Wolfensohn Center for Development analyzes how resources, knowledge and implementation capabilities can be combined toward broad-based economic and social change in a four-tier world.
The following principles guide the center's work:
A focus on impact, scaling-up and sustainability of development interventions
Bridging the gap between development theory and practice to bring about action The school is committed to the creation of knowledge, the dissemination of best practice and the training of policy makers in the Arab world. To achieve this mission, the school is developing strong capabilities to support research and teaching programs including:
Applied research in public policy and management 
